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Abstract 
 
 
This paper is the first to look at the long-run (30-year) behavior of underwriting spreads in the 
markets for corporate equity and debt. Specifically, we analyze the determinants of underwriting 
spreads on corporate bond issues, secondary equity offerings and initial public offerings over the 
period 1970-2000. We explain the time-varying cross-sectional behavior of these spreads by 
analyzing three sets of variables or factors: macro (systematic) factors, investment banking market 
structure factors and issuer specific characteristics. We also analyze the relationship between the 
direct costs (underwriting spreads) and indirect costs (underpricing) of new issues. Among our many 
results we find an apparent decline in spreads over time, an increased clustering in spreads for both 
IPOs and SEOs, the dominance of issuer- specific characteristics in explaining spreads, and a 
relatively weak linkeage between the direct and indirect costs of issuance. 
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1. Introduction 
 
 Some recent papers (for example, Fama and French 2001) have found strong support for 
Donaldson’s (1961) pecking order theory of financing choice, wherein internally generated funds are 
preferred over debt to fund investment projects, and debt itself is preferred over outside equity. One 
quite neglected set of factors impacting the choice between debt and equity are differences in the 
transaction costs of issuance between the two types of securities.1 These transaction costs can be 
broken into two broad categories, “direct costs” to the issuer (or the gross fees charged by an 
investment or commercial bank), and “indirect costs” to the issuer (any underpricing that might have 
occurred on the first day of issue). This paper focuses on the direct costs of issuance using a long 
time series for three types of securities, namely, seasoned public equity offerings (SEOs), new or 
initial public equity offerings (IPOs), and public corporate debt issues.  
While an extensive literature has evolved regarding the indirect costs or underpricing of IPOs 
(see, Ritter and Welch 2002), a much smaller literature exists regarding the direct costs, or the gross 
fees, paid to underwriters of IPOs. In addition, while the degree of underpricing is important for 
IPOs, and reflects a major indirect cost borne by issuing firms, the degree of underpricing for SEOs 
and corporate debt offerings has generally been found to be much smaller.2 This implies that for 
SEOs and debt offerings, the bulk of the transaction costs to the issuer will be reflected in the gross 
fees paid to the underwriter(s) as well as other expenses relating to the security’s issue, such as legal 
and auditing costs and expenses. While data on other expenses is somewhat sketchy and not 
frequently available (see, for example, Altinkilic and Hansen 2000, and Lee, Lochhead, Ritter and 
Zhao 1996, – henceforth LLRZ), considerable information is available regarding the direct costs or 
gross compensation paid by issuers to the underwriters of their securities. As Ritter and Welch 
(2002) imply in their review of IPO underpricing, we know very little about the behavior of 
                                                 
1 Many other reasons, such as asymmetric information e.g., between managers and debt and/or equity holders, have been posited in the theoretical  
and empirical capital structure literature (see Harris and Raviv 1991 and Smith 1986 for  excellent surveys of these arguments).  
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underwriting spreads and in particular, about the factors that drive these spreads over relatively long 
periods of time.3  
Specifically, over relatively long periods of time, in addition to issuer firm-specific 
characteristic, changes in systematic or macroeconomic factors and competitive conditions in the 
market for underwriting services (such as the entrance of commercial banks into this market) may 
also be reflected in spreads.4  
 Accordingly, this paper seeks to make three contributions to the existing literature on the 
direct transaction costs of securities issuance. First, this is one of the first to analyze the behavior of 
underwriting spreads over a long period of time on different types of publicly traded U.S. corporate 
securities. In particular, using a large number of issuing firms, for the years 1970 through 2000, we 
examine the cross-section time-series variation in underwriting spreads for three major types of 
corporate securities, SEOs, IPOs, and corporate debt issues, so as to gain insights into: (i) the general 
behavior of spreads over time and (ii) the relative size of spreads as a measure of the direct costs of 
securities issuance relative to the indirect costs of issuance (i.e., underpricing).  
Second, the existing empirical literature has yet to investigate the relative impact of 
systematic factors or macroeconomic risk factors on spreads. For example, Gande, Puri and Saunders 
(1999) largely focus on competitive conditions while others, e.g., Altinkilic and Hansen (2000), and 
Hansen (2002) largely focus on issuer firm-specific characteristics. In this paper we examine the 
additional impact of a comprehensive set of systematic or macroeconomic variables on IPO, SEO, 
and corporate debt underwriting spreads as well.  In particular, we include in our statistical tests 
(one-month lagged) values of: (i) the three Fama and French (1993) factors which have been shown 
to be correlated with stock returns (i.e., the value-weighted market portfolio, the size factor and the 
                                                                                                                                                             
2 For example, Datta, Datta and Patel (1997) show in a small sample of 50 firms that first day (short term) returns on corporate bond issues were 
insignificantly different from zero.   
3 For example, previous studies that analyzed spreads have usually employed quite short time periods (see, for example LLRZ who look at 1990-
94 and Altinkilic and Hansen (2000) who look at 1990-97). 
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book-to-market factor), (ii) the Carhart (1997) momentum factor, (iii) monthly returns on one-year, 
five-year and 20-year government bonds, so as to control for term structure and inflationary 
expectations effects,5 (iv) the return on Ritter’s value-weighted IPO index, in order to capture 
systematic effects in the new issue markets, not captured by the three Fama and French factors plus 
the momentum factor, and (v) the return on a value- weighted market index in the 15 days before the 
new issue (see Loughran and Ritter 2002). 
 Third, we also include in our tests a wide set of issuer firm-specific variables and 
(underwriting) market condition variables. Following Hansen (2001) who analyzes IPO spreads only, 
we incorporate issuer firm-specific variables that reflect profitability and leverage. We also control 
for the size of issuer proceeds, whether or not there was an over allotment option (see Hansen, Fuller 
and Janjigian 1987), the reporting of financial information by the firm and where relevant (in the case 
of corporate bonds) Moody’s credit rating of the issue, its maturity and callability. With respect to 
underwriting market conditions, we control for the entry of commercial banks into the market for 
corporate securities underwriting (see, Gande, Puri and Saunders 1999) and the market share of lead 
underwriters (see, Aggarwal, Prabhala and Puri 2002, Megginson and Weiss 1991, and Carter and 
Manaster 1990). 
 Briefly, our major findings are summarized below.  First, with respect to the time-series of 
underwriting spreads we find: 
1. A gradual secular decline in median and (for IPO and SEOs) mean or average 
underwriting spreads over the last three decades. Specifically, for all three spreads (IPOs, 
SEOs and corporate debt) the 1970s had the highest median underwriting spreads, 
followed by the 1980s, with the 1990s having the lowest median spreads. The decline in 
                                                                                                                                                             
4 Rather than talking about the absolute level of underwriting fees (in dollars), we concentrate on underwriter fees defined as the difference 
between the offered amount and the proceeds to the issuer as a percentage of the offered amount (issue size). 
5 Since one of the objectives of this paper is to look at the effects of systematic and macroeconomic factors on spreads, we do not explicitly 
deflate independent variables such as new issue proceeds for price level effects, rather we try to control for such factors by including them as 
components of explanatory (macroeconomic), control variables e.g., inflationary expectations being reflected in Treasury bill rates. 
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spreads in the 1990s was statistically significant compared to those in the 1970s and 
1980s. 
2. Consistent with the findings of Chen and Ritter (2000) and Hansen (2001), we find a 
clustering of median IPO spreads around seven percent that gets stronger with the 
passage of time. Indeed, the median IPO spread is exactly seven percent in the 1990s. 
Interestingly, we also find an increased tendency for SEO spreads to cluster around five-
percent, especially after 1989. 
3. Over the 30-year period, we find average IPO spreads of 7.06%, with average 
underpricing on day of issue of 31.37%. Thus the long-term average ratio of direct to 
indirect costs for IPO issuers has been of the order of 25%. For SEOs we find average 
underwriting spreads of 5.01%, compared to average underpricing of 2.63% (a ratio of 
direct to indirect costs of 190%). This supports the widely held view that the direct costs 
of issuance are higher for SEOs than are the indirect costs. For corporate debt, we find 
average spreads of 1.15%. Given the difficulty of generating one-day returns for a 
sufficient number of debt IPOs, we did not directly calculate one-day returns. 
Nevertheless, for a very small sample of 50 firms, Datta, Datta, and Patel (1997) estimate 
first day returns on corporate debt to be close to zero (0.15%). Moreover the consensus in 
the literature to date appears to be that one-day returns on corporate debt issues are 
extremely small.6  Consequently, the direct costs of corporate debt issuance, as with 
SEOs, appear to be more important on average than the indirect (underpricing) costs. 
4. The direct costs (spreads) of SEO issuance appear to be positively correlated with 
indirect costs (underpricing). For IPOs direct and indirect costs appear to have been 
largely independent. 
                                                 
6 See, for example, Ritter and Welch (2002). 
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Second, with respect to the systematic (macroeconomic) effects on underwriting spreads we 
find: 
1. That systematic risk factors (jointly) have a statistically significant but small economic 
effect on all three underwriting spreads over the 30-year period. The impact of the 
systematic factors also appear to differ between expansionary and recessionary periods 
with their effect in recessions being stronger for debt issues. 
2. All three Fama-French factors have no significant individual impact on spreads while the 
momentum factor has a positive and statistically significant impact on debt and SEO 
spreads. 
3. The return on the (one-month lagged) IPO index has a positive and statistically 
significant relationship with all three underwriting spreads. Thus, we find a “sentiment 
index” that is correlated not only with IPO spreads but also with SEO and debt spreads as 
well. 
4. The three-government bond returns factors jointly have a statistically significant effect on 
all three underwriting spreads. 
Finally, with respect to the effects of issuer firm-specific variables and competitive 
conditions in the market for underwriting services we find: 
1. Higher leverage has had a positive and statistically significant impact on debt spreads but 
no significant impact on either IPO or SEO spreads. Accounting measures of firm 
profitability have no significant impact on either debt or IPO spreads. 
2. Consistent with prior studies we find that issuers with an overallotment option have a 
higher underwriting spread for IPOs. We also find a positive relationship for both SEOs 
and debt offerings. 
3. Consistent with Gande, Puri and Saunders (1999), we find that longer maturity debt and 
non-investment grade debt have higher spreads while callable debt has lower spreads. 
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4. With respect to the market conditions for underwriting we find: (i) the market share of 
lead managers of an issue, in the year of offering, to be negatively related to all three 
underwriting spreads, (ii) the entry of commercial banks into the market for underwriting, 
to have had a significantly negative effect on debt spreads (consistent with Gande, Puri 
and Saunders 1999) and (iii) a significantly positive effect on SEO spreads (with the 
impact on IPO spreads being insignificant). 
In the remainder of the paper, we discuss our sample in Section 2, and provide descriptive 
results regarding the long-run (30-year) behavior of spreads in Section 3. We describe and motivate 
the various independent variables used in our regression specifications in Section 4.  Section 5 
reports the results of statistical tests designed to determine the joint and individual effects of the 
different systematic factors, issuer firm-specific characteristics, and competitive factors on 
underwriting spreads over the last 30 years. Section 6 presents results analyzing the long-term 
relationship between the direct and indirect costs of underwriting SEOs and IPOs.  Finally Section 7 
is a conclusion 
 
2. Data description and sample creation 
The core database for our study is the US public new-issues database of the Securities Data 
Corporation (SDC). The SDC database is compiled from regulatory filings, news sources, company 
press releases and prospectuses. We examine 30 years of data 1970 through to 2000. We exclude all 
financial firms (one-digit SIC code 6) and all firms in regulated industries (one- digit SIC code 4) and 
all firms whose gross spread data were missing from the SDC database. We obtained information on 
issuer firm-specific characteristics, such as the date of issuance, the size of the issue (proceeds), 
etc..., as well information on the underwriting market, such as the names of the lead managers of 
each issue and their individual annual shares of underwriting in the market under consideration. 
While some of these data are provided by SDC, we supplemented the SDC database with financial 
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variables drawn from Compstat. In the case of debt spreads, we excluded all convertible debt issues. 
This resulted in a final sample of 5645 issues for debt (compared to a total of 8085 issues available 
on SDC), 2691 issues of SEOs (compared to a total available SDC sample of 6573), and 2268 issues 
of IPOs (compared to a total SDC sample of 7517). 
Using this sample of firms, we then obtained data for our systematic (macroeconomic) 
factors. The 15-day value-weighted return on the market index was obtained from CRSP, as was the 
one month lagged return on the market index. The Fama-French factors were obtained from Ken 
French, and the returns on the momentum factor were obtained from Mark Carhart. The return on the 
IPO index was obtained from Jay Ritter’s website (http://bear.cba.ufl.edu/ritter). All three 
government bond return variables were obtained from the 2001 yearbook of stocks, bonds, bills and 
inflation published by Ibbotson Associates. We define recession quarters using NBER’s Business 
Cycle Dating Committee Memorandum of May 2002. Accordingly, the NBER recession periods for 
our sample are: November to December 1970, November 1973 to March 1975, January 1980 to July 
1980, July 1981 to November 1982, and July 1990 to March 1991. 
 
3. The long-run behavior of underwriting spreads 
In this section we provide preliminary evidence on the behavior of underwriting spreads over 
the 1970-2000 sample period. We present and discuss data for the whole-sample period, each decade, 
annually as well as quarterly, focusing on the time-variation shown in underwriting spreads. For each 
period, the 5th percentile, average, median and 95th percentile spreads are reported for each of the 
three classes of securities, publicly traded corporate debt, seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) and 
IPOs. 
Panel A of Table 1 shows underwriting spreads for the sample of firms used in our 
regressions (i.e., firms for which we have data on both the dependent and independent variables).  
Panel B includes issues for which we have data on underwriting spreads only (i.e., firms for whom 
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we do not have complete data on the independent variables).  Panel C presents one-day initial returns 
for IPOs and SEOs7 -- where initial returns are computed as the difference between the closing price 
on the day issue and the offering price, expressed as a percentage of the offering price (consistent 
with Lee, Lochhead, Ritter, and Zhao 1996). 
Table 1 
 As can be seen in Panels A and B of Table 1, the highest underwriting spreads occurred on 
average for IPOs, followed by SEOs and corporate debt offerings. Based on these data it is clear that 
underwriting spreads on debt are substantially lower than those on equity, and suggest that ignoring 
direct issuance costs, as part of the capital structure decision, may bias models of optimal capital 
structure towards lower debt-equity ratios than would be the case if real world frictions relating to 
direct transaction/issuance costs were incorporated into such models. Indeed, the mean or average 
underwriting spreads for our sample over the entire 1970-2000 periods were 1.149% for debt, 
5.008% for SEOs, and 7.057% for IPOs.  
From Table 1 Panels A and B, looking at the means and medians, there appears to be an 
increased tendency for IPO spreads to cluster around seven percent (Chen and Ritter 2000, Hansen 
2002), and for SEOs to cluster around five-percent. While the former has been well recognized in the 
literature, the tendency for SEO spreads to cluster around five-percent has avoided much comment to 
date. 
Panel C computes summary statistics on initial returns (one-day returns) for SEOs and IPOs. 
Since these returns reflect “money left on the table” by issuers they can be viewed as an “indirect” 
cost to firms of new securities issuance. Because most corporate bonds are traded OTC (and often 
infrequently), computing initial returns on corporate debt instruments is a difficult task. Nevertheless, 
Dutta, Dutta and Patel using a small sample of 50 issues over the 1976-1988 periods find average 
one-day returns on corporate bonds of approximately zero (0.15%). Indeed, the consensus in the 
                                                 
7 Consistent with most of the extant literature, we were unable to compute the indirect costs of debt, because we do not have debt prices. 
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literature to date (for example, Ritter and Welch 2002, Chen and Ritter 2000, and Hansen 2002) 
appears to be that corporate debt underpricing is close to zero. 
For SEOs and IPOs issues in our sample we computed initial one-day returns. We find that 
mean (median) one-day returns are 2.628% (0.926%) for SEOs, and 31.215%% (8.333%) for IPOs. 
This suggests that on average, the direct issuance costs of SEOs have been greater than their indirect 
costs, while for IPOs the reverse is clearly true. For debt, our sample’s average underwriting spread 
of 1.149% is clearly higher than what most studies have found so far regarding the size of corporate 
debt underpricing. 
Tables 2 through 4 breakdown spread data by decade and by year. Table 2 shows this 
breakdown for corporate debt offerings. While there are some atypical years, in general the mean and 
median debt spreads in the 1970s and 1980s appear to have been quite similar. However, as is 
especially clear from Panel A of Table 2, the mean and median debt underwriting spreads fell in the 
1990s compared to the prior decades, e.g., mean (median) debt underwriting spreads of 1.746% 
(0.878%) in the 1980s, versus 0.843% (0.651%) in the 1990s. The decline and median spread 
differences between the 1970s versus 1990s, and 1980s versus 1990s are all statistically significant at 
the one-percent level. This decline in spreads is consistent with a major impact on debt spreads 
resulting from increased competition from commercial bank’s Section 20 subsidiaries for much of 
the 1990’s.8 This result is also consistent with those found in Gande, Puri and Saunders (1999), who 
found enhanced competitive effects resulting from the entry of Section 20 subsidiaries into the 
market for underwriting services for debt issues over the period 1989-1994.  
Table 2 
Table 3 shows comparable results for SEO spreads. We find that both average and median 
spreads appear to have declined over the last three decades. Specifically, we find average (median) 
                                                 
8 Selected section 20 subsidiaries of commercial banks were given corporate debt underwriting powers in 1989 and equity underwriting powers in 
1990. 
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spreads of 5.637% (5.515%) in the 1970s, 5.524% (5.238%) in the 1980s and 4.709% (4.958%) in 
the 1990s. However, only the difference in mean and median spreads between the 1970s and 1990s, 
and 1980s and 1990s are significant at the one-percent level. There also appears to have been an 
increased clustering of spreads at the 5% level in the 1990s (see also the discussion of the quarterly 
results to follow).  
Table 3 
Table 4 shows the results for IPO spreads. As with debt and SEO spreads, both average and 
median spreads are lower in the 1990s compared to the 1980s and 1970s. Again, the 1990 spreads are 
significantly lower than those in the 1970s and 1980s. Also note the increased tendency for spreads 
to cluster in the 1990s at seven percent (see also Chen and Ritter 2000, and Hansen 2002). Indeed, 
not only is the median spread seven percent in the 1990s, but so is the 95th percentile IPO spread. 
Note that the number of IPOs in our 1970s sample is quite small because of the requirement that 
issuer firm-specific information be available so as to conduct the tests regarding the determination of 
spreads (see Section 5).  
Table 4 
Figures 1 and 2 graphically show trends in the quarterly mean and median spreads on debt, 
SEOs and IPOs respectively. Figure 1 shows a gradual lowering of mean quarterly spreads in the 
1990s as compared to the 1980s and 1970s, confirming the results observed in Tables 2 through 4. 
This trend is also reflected in quarterly median spreads (Figure 2). Also apparent from Figures 1 and 
2 is the tighter clustering of the quarterly mean and median spreads in the 1990s – especially of IPOs 
around seven percent and of SEOs around five percent.  
Figures 1 and 2 
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4.  Description of independent variables used in the regressions  
 In this section we describe the different independent variables used in our spread regressions. 
We classify these variables into three broad categories, namely macroeconomic or systematic 
variables, investment banking market structure variables, and issuer firm-specific variables. We 
describe these variables below. 
4.1. Macroeconomic or systematic variables 
 Given that one facet of this paper is the magnitude of the impact on the costs of external 
capital from changes in the economic environment, we include a number of proxies that have been 
used in the literature to capture market risk and market timing.   
Loughran and Ritter (2002) provide a prospect theory explanation for market timing of new 
issues and their cost. They argue that issuers bargain hard over the offer price in bad states of the 
world, and do not bargain as hard in good states of the world. Therefore, issuance costs might be 
higher in good states of the world than in bad, resulting in more money being left on the table in 
rising markets. As in their paper, we define a variable, 15 day, which is the value-weighted market 
index in the 15-days prior to the offer date. We also include the three Fama and French (1993) 
factors, which have been shown to be correlated with stock returns. These are the value-weighted 
market portfolio (Rmt), the size factor (SMB), defined as the monthly returns on the smallest Fama-
French portfolio minus the monthly returns on the largest Fama-French portfolio, and the book-to-
market factor (HML), defined as the monthly returns on the highest book-to-market Fama-French 
portfolio minus the monthly returns on the lowest book-to-market Fama-French portfolio.  
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), among others, have found that momentum investing, i.e., a 
strategy of going long on past winners and going short on past losers tends to produce positive excess 
returns. In order to test if momentum investing is related to the costs of external capital, we include 
Carhart’s (1997) momentum factor, defined as the monthly returns on an equally- weighted average 
of the highest 30 percent 11-month returns minus the monthly returns on an equally-weighted 
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average of the lowest 30 percent 11-month returns. We also include monthly returns on Ritter’s 
value-weighted IPO index (IPO), in order to capture systematic effects in the new issue market, not 
captured by the three Fama and French factors plus the momentum factor. Finally, we include three 
variables to control for term structure and inflationary expectation effects. These three varaibles are 
the monthly returns on one-year government bills (Tbill), the monthly returns on five-year 
government bonds (Inter), and the monthly returns on 20-year government bonds (Long), 
respectively. 
 4.2. Investment banking market structure variables 
Gande, Puri, and Saunders (1999) found that the entry of banks’ section 20 subsidiaries into 
the market for underwriting debt issues in 1989, reduced debt underwriting spreads. Accordingly, we 
include a variable Bank that is set to unity if the securities issue was after 1988, and zero otherwise.  
Since, bank section 20 subsidiaries were only allowed to enter the SEO and IPO underwriting 
markets in 1990, we redefine the variable Bank for equity issues setting it equal to unity if the issue 
was after 1989, and zero otherwise. 
The extant literature has found that issues underwritten by more reputable underwriters tend 
to have different first day returns from those issues underwritten by less reputable underwriters, (see 
for example, Carter and Manaster 1990, Megginson and Weiss 1991, and Aggarwal, Prabhala, and 
Puri 2002). Consistent with these papers, we include a variable Mktshr, defined as the total 
percentage underwriting market share of the lead managers of the issue in the year of issue, where 
each “market” is defined as debt, SEOs, and IPOs separately. 
4.3. Issuer firm-specific variables 
 We examine a number of variables that capture issuer firm profitability, leverage and size (as 
in Hansen 2001, who examines IPOs only). Specifically, we include two measures of firm 
profitability; ROA, defined as the ratio of the firm’s net income to total assets, and Profit, defined as 
the ratio of operating profit before depreciation to total assets. We include the leverage variable Debt, 
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defined as the ratio of total debt to assets. We found that neither SDC nor Compustat provided 
financial statement data for a number of issuer firms. Rather than discarding these firms, we included 
a dummy variable Dumfin that is set equal to unity when these variables were unavailable, and zero 
otherwise. Consistent with the previous literature (see for example, Hansen, and Gande, Puri, and 
Saunders 1999) we include a variable Size, defined as the natural logarithm of the dollar value of the 
issue size. 
 Ritter (1996) and Hansen, Fuller and Janjigian (1987) suggest that many issues include an 
over-allotment option that may add to the flotation cost of the issuer via the spread (see Hansen, 
Fuller and Janjigian (1987) pp. 24/25).9 We create a dummy variable Overallot, which is set equal to 
unity when the issue has an over-allotment option, and zero otherwise.10  
In the case of the corporate debt regressions, we include four other variables (see also, 
Gande, Puri, and Saunders (1999).  The first two variables deal with the maturity of debt: Lmat is a 
dummy variable for short-term debt and is set to unity if the debt issue has a maturity less than five 
years, Imat is a dummy variable for intermediate-term debt and is set to unity if the debt issue has 
maturity between five years and 15 years. For debt whose maturity is greater than 15 years, both 
Lmat and Imat are set to zero. The third variable, is a credit rating variable. We define a variable 
Rating, that is set equal to unity if the firm has a Moody’s speculative debt rating of Ba1 through C, 
and zero otherwise. Finally, we include a dummy variable Callable that is set equal to unity if the 
debt issue is a callable bond, and zero otherwise. 
 
5. Regressions results on the determinants of underwriting spreads 
In this section we analyze the individual and joint effects of systematic (macroeconomic), 
investment banking market structure and issuer firm-specific variables on debt and equity spreads. 
                                                 
9 Hansen, Fuller and Janjigian (1987) p. 25 argue: “One way the issuing company can compensate the syndicate for managing the over allotment 
problem is to pay a larger underwriter spread on the offering date.” 
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Specifically, in Table 5, we present the results of regressing debt and equity underwriting spreads on 
various macroeconomic (systematic), investment banking market structure, and issuer firm-specific 
factors. All regressions include industry dummies (at the one-digit SIC code level),11 and coefficient 
standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity using the White correction. For convenience, each 
independent variable is defined again in Appendix A. In order to examine the relative importance of 
each category of variables (i.e., macroeconomic, market structure, issuer firm-specific), we then 
present the results of two tests in Table 6 regarding the joint importance and significance of each 
category of variables. The first is an F-test of the null hypothesis that the joint effect of each category 
of variables is zero. The second test relates to estimation of a coefficient of partial determination, or 
partial R2, for each category of variables. The partial R2 between a Y-variable (i.e., underwriting 
spreads in our case) and a set of X-variables (X1), given that the other X-variables (X2) are in the 
regression model, is calculated as [SSE (X2)-SSE (X1,X2)] / SSE(X2), where SSE(X2) is the residual 
sum of squares when only X2 variables are in the model, and SSE(X1,X2) is the residual sum of 
squares when both X1 and X2 variables are in the model.  It should be noted that partial R2’s, while 
indicating the relative explanatory power of a group of variables, will not sum to the R2 of the full 
model12. An explanation for this, following Pindyck and Rubenfeld (1981), is presented in Appendix 
B. 
Tables 5 and 6 
 
5.1. Debt spreads 
The first column of Table 5 presents parameter coefficients and t-statistics when the dependent 
variable is the underwriting spread on debt issues.    
5.1.1. Systematic or Macroeconomic variables 
                                                                                                                                                             
10 Commonly the over allotment option allows for up to 15% more shares to issued and allocated to investors. 
11 For reasons of space the industry dummy variable coefficients are not reported. 
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Of the nine systematic or macroeconomic variables discussed earlier, three are statistically 
significant in Table 5 at the five-percent level: the Carhart momentum factor (Mom) and the t-bill 
return (Tbill) are both positively signed and the intermediate bond return is negatively signed (Inter). 
Table 6 shows that the null hypothesis that the joint effect of the nine macroeconomic variables on 
debt spreads is zero is rejected at the one-percent level.  
The evidence on these macroeconomic factors suggests that when secondary markets are 
relatively hot (as reflected in the momentum factor), underwriters tend to widen spreads. Similarly 
when nominal t-bill rates (returns) are high spreads also widen.13 However, while a significant joint 
effect of the macro-factors on debt spreads cannot be rejected at the 1% level, the partial R2 on the 
nine macroeconomic variables is only 0.012. This result suggests that while macroeconomic factors 
may have a statistically significant impact on debt spreads, their effect is economically very small.14 
5.1.2. Investment banking market structure variables 
The two investment banking variables, bank entry (Bank) and lead manager’s market share 
(Mktshr) are both significantly negative in the debt regression. The negative sign on the bank entry 
variable supports the earlier findings of Gande, Puri and Saunders (1999), for the relatively short 
1989-94 period, i.e., that the entry of commercial banks as underwriters post-1988 has had a pro-
competitive effect on the market for corporate debt underwriting. Interestingly, the lead manager’s 
market share variable also has a negative sign. This may reflect the propensity of major lead 
managers to “low-ball” so as to build future market share (see Saunders and Srinivasan 2002), and/or 
reflects the fact that ex-ante, “major” lead managers tend to underwrite higher (credit) quality issues. 
Table 6 shows that the null hypothesis of no joint effect of the two investment banking market 
structure variables on debt spreads is strongly rejected at the one-percent level in a standard F-test. 
                                                                                                                                                             
12 All reported R2s and partial R2s are adjusted for degrees of freedom. 
13 One explanation for this result is that increased inflationary expectations implicit in higher nominal short-term rates make debt securities more 
sensitive to systematic/macroeconomic risk such as systemic default risk. 
14 The full model R2 is 0.605. 
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The partial R2 on the investment banking market structure variables is 0.065.  This result suggests 
that banking market structure variables also have had a relatively small joint impact on debt spreads.  
5.1.3. Issuer firm-specific characteristics 
As in previous studies – see Altinkilic and Hansen (2000) for example – the major 
determinants of spreads, statistically speaking, appear to be issuer firm-specific characteristics. Of 
the ten characteristics employed in the debt regressions, eight are statistically significant; the only 
two that are statistically insignificant (at the five-percent level) are the ROA and Profit variables. For 
the statistically significant variables, spreads tend to be higher, the greater the issuer’s leverage 
(Leverage), the less financial information the firm discloses on SDC and Compustat (Dumfin), the 
greater the use by the underwriter of an over-allotment option (Overallot), the longer the maturity of 
the debt (Imat), and the lower is its Moody’s credit rating (Rating). To some extent, all of the 
variables are directly or indirectly proxying for the credit quality of the borrower and hence the risk 
faced by the underwriter should the issue fail to be placed. There are also three variables with 
negative signs, Size, the dummy reflecting short maturity, i.e, less than five-years maturity (Lmat), 
and callability (Callable). The finding of the negative sign on Size is consistent with economies of 
scale in debt underwriting. Table 6 shows that the null hypothesis that the joint effect of the ten issuer 
firm-specific variables on debt spreads is zero, is strongly rejected at the one-percent level. The 
partial R2 on the issuer firm-specific variables is 0.517. This result suggests that issuer firm-specific 
variables have a large economic and statistically significant impact on debt spreads. 
5.1.4. Macroeconomic variables and recessions 
Over the sample period there were five, relatively short recession periods. We broke out, as a 
separate sub-sample, those debt issues that came to market in the recessionary period and re-
estimated our spread regression for those observations (n=429). As might be expected the 
macroeconomic variables individually and jointly were more significant during this period. 
Specifically, five out of the eight independent variables (15 day, HML, Mom, Tbill, and Inter) were 
 18
statistically significant at the five-percent level, and the partial R2 for the joint effect of the 
macroeconomic variables was 0.10, much larger than that found for the sample as whole (.012).15 
5. 2. SEO spreads 
We next carry out a similar analysis for the determinants of SEO spreads. 
5.2.1. Macroeconomic variables  
In Table 5, column 2, for SEOs, four of the nine macroeconomic variables are significant at 
the five-percent level. Interestingly, both the momentum variable (Mom) and the sentiment index 
(IPO) have positive effects on SEO spreads as does short term Treasury bill returns (Tbill). This 
again suggests that in relatively hot markets, investment banks’ underwriting spreads tend to widen. 
Table 6 shows that the null hypothesis that the joint effect of the macroeconomic variables on SEO 
spreads is not significant is strongly rejected at the one-percent level in a standard F-test. The partial 
R2 for the macroeconomic variables is 0.033.  As in the case for debt spreads, we find that jointly the 
macroeconomic variables have a statistically significant but very small economic impact on SEO 
spreads.  
5.2.2. Investment banking market structure variables 
With respect to the investment banking variables, the commercial bank entry dummy variable 
Bank appears to have had a significant and positive effect on spreads. This is not surprising given the 
fact that others, e.g., Gande, Puri and Saunders (1999) and Mullineaux and Roten (2002) did not find 
similar pro-competitive effects from bank entry into equity underwriting compared to debt 
underwriting. One possible reason for this is that commercial banks’ customer relationship effects 
and their expertise in monitoring may be better suited to underwriting debt instruments, such as loans 
and bonds, rather than equity instruments. As was the case for debt, the higher are the market shares 
of lead underwriters the lower are SEO spreads. The null hypothesis that both of these market 
structure variables are jointly zero is strongly rejected at the 1% level. The partial R2 on the 
                                                 
15 These results are not presented in Tabular form due to space considerations. However, the results are available from the authors on request. 
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investment banking market structure variables is 0.026. This result suggests that banking market 
structure variables have a statistically significant but small impact on SEO spreads, a result that is 
similar to that found for corporate debt spreads. 
5.2.3. Issuer firm-specific characteristics 
Since we are examining SEOs, variables such as debt maturity (Lmat and Imat), credit ratings 
(Ratings), and whether the debt is callable (Callable) were all dropped from the regression 
specification as they pertain to debt characteristics. Of the six remaining issuer firm-specific 
characteristics, three were statistically significant: Profit, Size, and Overallot. Size and over-allotment 
(Overallot) have the same positive signs as in the debt regression, while Profit has a negative sign, 
i.e., more profitable firm issues have generally been charged smaller spreads. An F-test strongly 
rejects the null that the joint effect of issuer firm-specific variables is zero. The partial R2 on the 
issuer firm-specific variables is 0.407. This result suggests that issuer firm-specific variables have a 
large and statistically significant impact on SEO spreads, which is generally consistent with that 
found for debt spreads. 
5.2.4. Macroeconomic variables and the recession  
As for debt, we also conducted similar tests for SEOs during recessionary periods. Here the 
size of the SEO sample was again quite small (n=161). In this case the partial R2 for the 
macroeconomic variables was 0.019, less than the partial R2 (0.033) found in the full sample 
regression. Overall, macroeconomic variables did not appear to explain much of the variation in SEO 
spreads – especially in recessionary periods.16 
5.3. IPO Spreads 
5.3.1. Macroeconomic variables 
For IPOs two of the nine variables are independently significant: the sentiment index (IPO) 
and the return on Treasury-bills (Tbill).  Nevertheless, we find that the null hypothesis of a zero joint 
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effect of the macroeconomic variables on IPO spreads is still rejected at the one-percent level in a 
standard F-test. The partial R2 on the macroeconomic variables is 0.058. As before, we find that 
jointly macroeconomic variables have a statistically significant but relatively small impact on (IPO) 
spreads. 
5.3.2. Investment banking market structure variables 
For IPOs the commercial bank entry dummy variable (Bank) is statistically insignificant, 
although there is a strong and significantly negative effect coming from the market share variable 
(Mktshr), which also has a negative effect on spreads in both the debt and SEO regressions. The joint 
effect of the investment banking market structure variables is also significantly different from zero. 
The partial R2 of the investment banking market structure variables is 0.003. This result suggests that 
banking market structure variables have a statistically significant, but very small, impact on IPO 
spreads, a result similar to that found for SEO spreads and thus appears to hold for equity spreads in 
general. 
5.3.3. Issuer firm-specific characteristics 
As with both debt and SEOs, most explanatory power regarding the variation of spreads over 
our long panel sample period comes from issuer firm-specific characteristics.  Three of the six 
independent variables are statistically significant with Size having the expected negative sign (see 
Ritter and Welch 2002 for example) and with the Dumfin and Overallot variables having positive 
signs. With respect to the Dumfin variable, the less financial information regarding the new issue that 
is available (in our case on SDC and Compustat), the higher the gross spread demanded by the 
underwriter. An F-test strongly rejects the null hypothesis that the joint effect of issuer firm-specific 
variables is zero. The partial R2 on the issuer firm-specific variables is 0.400. This result suggests 
that issuer firm-specific variables have a large and statistically significant impact on IPO spreads, 
which is generally consistent with that found for both debt and SEO spreads.  
                                                                                                                                                             
16 These results are available on request from the authors, as they are not presented due to space considerations.  
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We repeated all specifications in Table 5 with the inclusion of three new variables for traded 
firms only. Altinkilic and Hansen (2000) suggest a “spectrum view” of U-shaped spreads wherein 
variable costs are rising for lower quality issuers. Consistent with their specification, we include a 
variable Size1, defined as the inverse of the dollar value of the issue size, and a variable Size2 which 
is the interaction of the dollar value of the issue size divided by the market value of equity.  Altinkilic 
and Hansen (2000) find a positive sign on Size1 and a positive sign on Size2 for SEOs and debt 
issues.  We are unable to calculate Size2 for firms that did not have a market value of equity on 
CRSP and for IPOs. Lowry and Schwert (2001) and Lowry (2002) find that IPO volume and initial 
returns are significantly correlated. Consistent with Lowry (2002), we calculate a variable Volume 
defined as the number of debt issues (or SEOs or IPOs respectively) divided by the number of CRSP-
listed stocks. Similar to Lowry (2002), we use the compounded growth rate of 0.45% per year in the 
number of CRSP-listed stocks for the pre-November 1972 period. For the sub-sample of traded 
firms, we find a positive sign on Size1 and Size2 for both SEO and debt issues, a result that is 
consistent with those of Altinkilic and Hansen (2000). As in Lowry (2002), we also find Volume to 
be positively related to spreads.  These results on the sub-sample of traded firms are available on 
request from the authors, as they are not presented in Tabular form here due to space considerations. 
5.3.4 Macroeconomic variables and the recession 
Interestingly, in the case of IPOs, running the regression over periods that just contain 
recession months greatly reduced both the absolute and relative explanatory power of the 
macroeconomic variables. Indeed, the adjusted partial R2 for these variables, during recession 
periods, was –0.015. Overall, the R2 for all variables in the IPO regression was during recessionary 
periods 0.718 (compared to 0.617 for the whole sample).17 
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6.  Direct costs versus indirect costs 
 As discussed in the introduction to this paper, much of the literature to date on the cost of 
new issues has concerned the indirect costs of issurance, in particular, the degree to which IPOs are 
underpriced on the day of issue. The conventional way these “indirect” costs have been measured has 
been through an analysis of initial day returns on the security being issued. In this section we repeat a 
similar analysis, to that conducted above for direct costs, for the initial one-day returns on IPOs and 
SEOs. We then go on to look at the relationship between direct costs (underwriting spreads) and 
indirect costs (underpricing) over our 30-year panel sample to examine whether direct and indirect 
costs are related? For example, are indirect costs (underpricing) higher when direct costs (spreads) 
are higher or do the two costs, in part, offset each other? Finally, we combine the direct and indirect 
costs of issuance into a “total cost” measure and examine how our three groups of factors or variables 
have driven “total costs” of issuance over our 30-year sample period. 
6.1 Indirect costs and their determinants 
 Figures 3 and 4, show respectively the quarterly means and medians of initial one-day returns 
over the 1970-2000 period. In Table 7 we show regressions for the indirect costs of issuance (one-
day) returns on the same set of variables used in the spread regressions, while Table 8 reports the 
partial and total R2s, and significance tests for the three groups of factors: macroeconomic, market 
structure and issuer firm-specific. 
Figures 3 and 4, Tables 7 and 8 
6.1.1. SEOs indirect costs and their determinants 
 We begin by examining Table 7, where one observes that no individual systematic or macro-
factors are significant. Interestingly, however, both market structure variables are significant. That is, 
commercial bank section 20 subsidiaries have tended to underprice SEOs more than traditional 
investment banks, while lead managers (with larger market shares) have tended to underprice less 
                                                                                                                                                             
17 These results are available on request from the authors, as they are not presented in Tabular form here due to space considerations. 
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than lead managers with smaller market shares. The greater underpricing by bank section 20 
subsidiaries may reflect their tendency to concentrate more on smaller issues especially in the early 
1990s when they were given equity underwriting powers (see, Gande, Puri and Saunders (1999)). For 
issuer firm specific characteristics, three variables are significant: the initial returns are lower for 
more profitable (high ROA) firms and for more highly-levered firms. Those firms issuing SEOs with 
an overallotment option also appear to be more underpriced. 
 Table 8 shows the partial R2s and overall full model R2 of the three groups of variables: 
macroeconomic (systematic), market structure and issuer-firm specific. As can be seen the overall R2 
= .038 is very small, and the largest partial R2 (and most significant) is for the investment banking 
market structure variables as a group (partial R2 = .023).18 
6.1.2. IPOs indirect costs and their determinants 
 Table 7 column 2 shows for IPOs the individual coefficients and their significance for the full 
set of variables used in the underwriting spread regressions. Overall the fit of the full model is much 
better than for SEOs, with an R2 of 0.241. For the macroeconomic group of variables, five are 
individually significant at the one-percent level, with the strongest (statistically speaking) effect 
emanating from the IPO index variable. Specifically, in relatively hot markets when the IPO index is 
high, so is the degree of IPO underpricing and thus indirect costs to issuers. This confirms a strong 
momentum effect impacting the degree of IPO underpricing (as in Lowry and Schwert 2001). As 
with SEOs both the commercial bank dummy and market share variables are significant.  However, 
lead managers with large market shares tend to underprice new issues more than those lead managers 
with smaller market shares. This may reflect the ability of high market share managers to exploit a 
reputational advantage through IPO pricing. Finally, four of the six issuer specific characteristics are 
significant at the ten-percent level or higher, with profit, dumfin and the size variable all negatively 
related to the degree of underpricing.  
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 Table 8 shows the partial R2’s and the significance of the three groups of variables. As can be 
seen, the systematic or macroeconomic variables (that include momentum variables) explain a 
significant component of the observed variability of IPO initial returns over the past 30 years. The 
market structure and issuer-firm specific variables while jointly significant, have a relatively small 
impact. 
6.2 The trade-off between direct and indirect costs 
 So far in this paper we have analyzed the direct costs and indirect costs of new security 
issuance separately. In this section we examine the degree to which there is a relationship between 
these two costs. In Table 9 we add to our set of regressors, initial one-day returns under the 
“investment banking market structure variables” grouping. The dependent variables are SEO 
underwriting spreads (column 1), and IPO underwriting spreads (column 2), respectively. For 
brevity, we focus only on the coefficients of the initial return or underpricing (Und. returns) variable. 
Specifically, from Table 9, column 1, it can be seen that initial one-day returns on SEOs are 
positively related to SEO spreads, i.e., direct and indirect costs charged by the underwriter to the 
issuer appear to be “complements.” By comparison the initial returns on IPOs and IPO spreads 
appear to be independent. For example, the sign on the IPO coefficient is very small and is 
insignificantly different form zero at the ten-percent level when control variables are present, and is 
zero otherwise. This result, found over a 30-year period, is interesting from an investment banking 
pricing perspective, implying that over time and across a large sample of IPOs, spreads and the 
degree of underpricing have largely been independent of each other. That is, empirically speaking at 
least, IPO spreads and underpricing do not appear to be jointly determined as suggested by Yeoman 
(2002).19 
Table 9 
                                                                                                                                                             
18 The reader is reminded (see Appendix B) that the partial R2s will not add to the full model R2. 
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6.3 The total costs of new issuance and their determinants 
As a final set of tests, we added the direct and indirect costs together, and called the resulting  
variable “total costs.” We recognize that certain underwriting costs, such as legal and auditing costs, 
are not included in our “total cost” variable. Table 10 presents the results for the total costs of SEO 
and IPO issuance using the same set of macroeconomic, market structure and issuer firm-specific 
variables used in our earlier spread and underpricing tests, and Table 11 presents the full model R2 
and partial R2s. 
Tables 10 and 11 
6.3.1. Total costs of SEOs and their determinants 
 Column 1 of Table 10 shows the results for SEOs. Only two of the macroeconomic variables 
are significant, the IPO index or momentum factor (at the five-percent level) and the Treasury bill 
rate (at the ten-percent level). For the market structure variables, bank section 20 underwriting has a 
significantly positive effect on the total costs of underwriting, while issues underwritten by lead 
managers with relatively high market share have lowered the total costs of underwriting. With 
respect to issuer firm-specific variables, profitability, leverage and size all have negative effects on 
SEO total issuance costs, while the presence of an over allotment option increases total costs.  The 
overall R2 of the model is only .071 (see Table 11), with each of the three groups of variables jointly 
significant but with a small collective economic impact on spreads. 
6.3.2. Total costs of IPOs and their determinants 
 Column 2 of Table 10 shows the results for the total costs of IPO issuance. For the 
macroeconomic factors, five are significant at the one-percent level, with Fama-French’s size and 
book-to-market factors having a negative effect on total costs. A similar negative relationship is 
found for the Treasury bill rate. Both the 15 day historical return and IPO index variables have 
                                                                                                                                                             
19 Yeoman (2001) finds support for his theoretical joint spread setting/underpricing model over the relatively short 1988-1993 period using 
simulation analysis on his model. 
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positive effects on total IPO costs, in line with a strong momentum effect on total costs in the market 
for IPO underwriting. For the market structure variables, both the commercial bank underwriting 
dummy and the lead underwriter market share variables are significantly positive. Finally, four of the 
issuer-specific characteristics are significant at the ten-percent level or above. Specifically 
profitability, the financial information dummy variable (Dummy fin) and size are all significantly 
negatively related to total underwriting costs.  From Table 11, the overall R2 for the full model is 
0.24, with the highest partial R2 (0.11) reflecting the macroeconomic variables, which include 
momentum. 
 
7. Summary and conclusions 
 This paper examines the long-run behavior of underwriting spreads and underpricing returns 
in the markets for corporate securities. Using a large panel sample covering 30 years, we analyze 
spreads in the corporate debt, SEO and IPO markets, respectively. This analysis is important because 
direct flotation costs are one element entering into corporate capital structure decisions. We find IPO 
spreads to be higher than SEO spreads and both spreads to be substantially higher than corporate debt 
spreads. We also find that median spreads appear to be trending down over time and that IPO and 
SEO spreads appear to be increasingly clustering (at respectively seven percent and five percent). 
 We also sought to analyze the cross-sectional time-series variation in these spreads. Three 
groups of candidate factors or variables were identified, macroeconomic (or systematic), investment 
banking market structure, and issuer-firm specific. While, macroeconomic and investment banking 
market factors were frequently jointly significant in explaining the variation in spreads, their impact 
was generally small. The group of factors largely driving spreads appears to be issuer-firm 
characteristics. 
 While underwriting spreads is one aspect (a direct aspect) of security issuance there are also 
indirect costs relating to underpricing. While it was not possible to estimate the degree of 
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underpricing for the corporate debt issues in our sample we did undertake an analysis of IPO and 
SEO underpricing over our 30-year period and the relative magnitudes of indirect costs to direct 
costs. For IPOs, on average, indirect costs significantly exceeded direct costs, however, the reverse 
appears to be true for SEOs. We also examined the relationship between the direct and indirect costs 
of SEOs and IPOs. While the direct and indirect costs of SEOs appear to be positively related, for 
IPOs the two costs appear to be largely independent. Overall, in equity markets, the degree of 
complementarity among direct and indirect issuance costs appears largely confined to SEOs.  
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Figure 1: Quarterly Means of Underwriting Spreads (“Direct Costs”)  
 
Underwriting spreads or "direct costs" are gross spreads defined as the difference between the offered amount and the proceeds to the issuer, expressed as the percentage of the offered amount (or 
issue size), see Gande, Puri, and Saunders (1999). Spreads are for the 30-year period, from 1970 through 2000, and are obtained from US Public New Issues Database from Securities and Data 
Corporation. We exclude all financial firms (one-digit SIC code 6) and all firms in regulated industries (one-digit SIC code 4) and all firms whose gross spread data was missing from the SDC 
database. Equity returns are obtained from CRSP.  
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Figure 2: Quarterly Medians of Underwriting Spreads (“Direct Costs”)  
 
Underwriting spreads or "direct costs" are gross spreads defined as the difference between the offered amount and the proceeds to the issuer, expressed as the percentage of the offered amount (or 
issue size), see Gande, Puri, and Saunders (1999). Spreads are for the 30-year period, from 1970 through 2000, and are obtained from US Public New Issues Database from Securities and Data 
Corporation. We exclude all financial firms (one-digit SIC code 6) and all firms in regulated industries (one-digit SIC code 4) and all firms whose gross spread data was missing from the SDC 
database. Equity returns are obtained from CRSP.  
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Figure 3: Quarterly Means of Underpricing Returns (“Indirect Costs”)  
 
Underpricing returns or "indirect costs" are defined as the difference between the closing price on the day after the issue and the offering price expressed as the percentage of the offering price, see 
Lee, Lochhead, Ritter, and Zhao (1996). Spreads are for the 30-year period, from 1970 through 2000, and are obtained from US Public New Issues Database from Securities and Data Corporation. 
We exclude all financial firms (one-digit SIC code 6) and all firms in regulated industries (one-digit SIC code 4) and all firms whose gross spread data was missing from the SDC database. Equity 
returns are obtained from CRSP. 
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Figure 4: Quarterly Medians of Underpricing Returns (“Indirect Costs”)  
 
Underpricing returns or "indirect costs" are defined as the difference between the closing price on the day after the issue and the offering price expressed as the percentage of the offering price, see 
Lee, Lochhead, Ritter, and Zhao (1996). Spreads are for the 30-year period, from 1970 through 2000, and are obtained from US Public New Issues Database from Securities and Data Corporation. 
We exclude all financial firms (one-digit SIC code 6) and all firms in regulated industries (one-digit SIC code 4) and all firms whose gross spread data was missing from the SDC database. Equity 
returns are obtained from CRSP. 
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Table 1: Underwriting Spreads ("Direct Costs") and Underpricing Returns ("Indirect Costs") 
 
Underwriting spreads or "direct costs" are gross spreads defined as the difference between the offered amount and the proceeds to the 
issuer, expressed as the percentage of the offered amount (or issue size), see Gande, Puri, and Saunders (1999). Underpricing returns 
or "indirect costs" are defined as the difference between the closing price on the day after the issue and the offering price expressed as 
the percentage of the offering price, see Lee, Lochhead, Ritter, and Zhao (1996). Spreads are for the 30-year period, from 1970 
through 2000, and are obtained from US Public New Issues Database from Securities and Data Corporation. We exclude all financial 
firms (one-digit SIC code 6) and all firms in regulated industries (one-digit SIC code 4) and all firms whose gross spread data was 
missing from the SDC database. Equity returns are obtained from CRSP. 
  
 
Panel A: Spreads for sample firms used in regressions (i.e., firms for which we have data on both the 
 independent and dependant variables)   
      #         mean                        median         5th %tile                 95th %tile   
          
Debt    5,645              1.149         0.678                     0.230                          3.530   
 
SEOs       2,691              5.008         5.000                     2.848                          7.474   
 
IPOs        2,268              7.057                         7.000                     5.250                          10.000   
 
 
Panel B: Spreads for entire sample of firms available from SDC (i.e., firms for which we have data on only 
 the spread variable)   
     #         mean                    median                   5th %tile                      95th %tile   
          
Debt    8,085               1.294         0.750                     0.250                        3.829   
 
SEOs       6,573               5.741         5.481                     3.205                        10.000   
 
IPOs       7,517                7.833         7.000                     6.000                         10.000  
 
 
Panel C: Underpricing returns for sample firms used in regressions and for whom we have stock returns    
   #       mean                       median               5th %tile                   95th %tile   
          
SEOs       1,999              2.628                       0.926                     -4.762                        13.415   
 
IPOs        1,713             31.215                       8.333                     -6.034                        156.25  
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Table 2: Distribution of Underwriting Spreads for Debt Offerings Over Time 
 
Underwriting spreads or "direct costs" are gross spreads defined as the difference between the offered amount and the proceeds to the 
issuer, expressed as the percentage of the offered amount (or issue size), see Gande, Puri, and Saunders (1999). Spreads are for the 30-
year period, from 1970 through 2000, and are obtained from US Public New Issues Database from Securities and Data Corporation. 
We exclude all financial firms (one-digit SIC code 6) and all firms in regulated industries (one-digit SIC code 4) and all firms whose 
gross spread data was missing from the SDC database. Equity returns are obtained from CRSP. p-values are given in parentheses and 
are for differences in means and medians between decades. The difference in means uses the standard t-test, whereas the differences in 
medians uses the Mann-Whitney rank sum test. 
 
Panel A: By Decade 
                                 1970s             1980s          1990s          '70s vs. '80s       '70s vs. '90s        '80s vs. '90s 
#                                563                1,465          3,617 
 
Mean                       1.563              1.746          0.843               (0.011)a              (0.000)a              (0.000)a 
 
Median                    0.882              0.878          0.651               (0.002)a              (0.000)a               (0.000)a  
 
 
Panel B: By Year 
                       #             Mean            Median                                           #               Mean            Median 
 
1970              70             1.205            0.879                          1986           273            1.647            0.880 
1971              68             1.197            0.879                          1987           206            1.792            0.878 
1972              36             1.249            0.884                          1988           187            2.020            0.879 
1973              25             1.272            0.879                          1989           190            1.726            0.757 
1974              13             0.901            0.875                          1990           154            0.658            0.628 
1975              64             1.128            0.875                          1991           254            0.747            0.651 
1976              70             1.318            0.878                          1992           352            1.073            0.678 
1977              88             2.128            1.008                          1993           426            1.177            0.875 
1978              69             2.381            1.263                          1994           261            1.061            0.652 
1979              60             1.826            0.882                          1995           330            0.878            0.653 
1980              74             1.326            0.875                          1996           329            0.867            0.651 
1981              91             1.455            0.879                          1997           375            0.758            0.651 
1982              82             1.561            0.875                          1998           527            0.712            0.629 
1983              89             2.021            0.883                          1999           386            0.632            0.625 
1984            102             1.885            0.879                          2000           223            0.559            0.554 
1985            171             1.770            0.877        
 
 
a statistically significant at the 1% level, b statistically significant at the 5% level, and c statistically significant at the 10% level, 
respectively. 
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Table 3: Distribution of Underwriting Spreads for Seasoned Equity Offerings Over Time 
 
Underwriting spreads or "direct costs" are gross spreads defined as the difference between the offered amount and the proceeds to the 
issuer, expressed as the percentage of the offered amount (or issue size), see Gande, Puri, and Saunders (1999). Spreads are for the 30-
year period, from 1970 through 2000, and are obtained from US Public New Issues Database from Securities and Data Corporation. 
We exclude all financial firms (one-digit SIC code 6) and all firms in regulated industries (one-digit SIC code 4) and all firms whose 
gross spread data was missing from the SDC database. Equity returns are obtained from CRSP. p-values are given in parentheses and 
are for differences in means and medians between decades. Differences in means uses the standard t-test whereas differences in 
medians uses the Mann-Whitney rank sum test. 
 
Panel A: By Decade 
                                 1970s             1980s          1990s          '70s vs. '80s       '70s vs. '90s        '80s vs. '90s 
#                                152                 814            1,725 
 
Mean                       5.637              5.524           4.709               (0.550)                (0.000)a             (0.000)a 
 
Median                    5.515              5.238           4.958               (0.299)                (0.000)a              (0.000)a 
 
 
Panel B: By Year 
                        #              Mean          Median                                                #               Mean           Median 
 
1970               12             5.756           5.556                           1986             105             5.085            5.000 
1971                 0                 --                --                               1987               88             4.938            4.747 
1972                 1             1.802           1.802                           1988               36             5.035            4.503 
1973                 1             3.747           3.747                           1989               47             5.406            5.231 
1974                 0                --                 --                               1990               56             5.038            4.944 
1975               12             5.285           4.720                           1991             136             4.593            4.532 
1976               46             5.002           4.698                           1992             127             4.634            4.506 
1977               22             5.679           5.393                           1993             177             4.810            4.871 
1978               32             6.704           6.000                           1994             121             4.630            4.736 
1979               26             5.739           5.720                           1995             161             4.603            4.809 
1980               85             5.881           5.823                           1996             172             4.713            4.765 
1981               60             6.071           5.730                           1997             192             4.794            5.000 
1982               67             5.583           5.111                           1998             142             4.649            5.000 
1983             176             5.423           5.244                           1999             194             4.617            4.877 
1984               57             6.393           5.500                           2000             247             4.808            5.000 
1985               93             5.765           5.205        
 
 
a statistically significant at the 1% level, b statistically significant at the 5% level, and c statistically significant at the 10% level, 
respectively. 
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Table 4: Distribution of Underwriting Spreads for Initial Public Equity Offerings Over Time 
 
Underwriting spreads or "direct costs" are gross spreads defined as the difference between the offered amount and the proceeds to the 
issuer, expressed as the percentage of the offered amount (or issue size), see Gande, Puri, and Saunders (1999). Spreads are for the 30-
year period, from 1970 through 2000, and are obtained from US Public New Issues Database from Securities and Data Corporation. 
We exclude all financial firms (one-digit SIC code 6) and all firms in regulated industries (one-digit SIC code 4) and all firms whose 
gross spread data was missing from the SDC database. Equity returns are obtained from CRSP. p-values are given in parentheses and 
are for differences in means and medians between decades. The difference in means uses the standard t-test whereas the differences in 
medians uses the Mann-Whitney rank sum test. 
 
Panel A: By Decade 
                                 1970s             1980s          1990s          '70s vs. '80s       '70s vs. '90s        '80s vs. '90s 
#                                  31                  682           1,555 
 
Mean                       7.695              7.911           6.670               (0.477)               (0.000)a              (0.000)a 
 
Median                    7.524              7.273           7.000               (0.544)               (0.000)a                (0.000)a  
 
 
Panel B: By Year 
                       #             Mean            Median                                             #             Mean            Median 
 
1970                4             7.161            6.429                          1986           132            7.436            7.000 
1971                0                --                  --                              1987           101            7.463            7.000 
1972                1             8.333            8.333                          1988             52            7.594            7.000 
1973                1             9.048            9.048                          1989             48            7.338            7.000 
1974                0                --                  --                              1990             43            7.499            7.000 
1975                1             7.576            7.576                          1991             95            6.548            7.000 
1976                9             7.529            6.875                          1992           123            6.534            7.000 
1977                5             7.519            6.347                          1993           145            6.535            7.000 
1978                3             7.652            6.889                          1994           102            6.369            7.000 
1979                7             8.090            7.520                          1995           118            6.547            7.000 
1980              25             8.906            9.545                          1996           196            6.603            7.000 
1981              54             8.719            9.959                          1997           150            6.578            7.000 
1982              21             8.790            8.400                          1998           105            6.641            7.000 
1983            116             8.181            7.750                          1999           222            6.835            7.000 
1984              70             8.392            7.500                          2000           256            6.870            7.000 
1985              63             7.912            7.200        
 
 
a statistically significant at the 1% level, b statistically significant at the 5% level, and c statistically significant at the 10% level, 
respectively. 
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Table 5: Regressions of Underwriting Spreads on Macroeconomic Variables, Investment Banking Market 
Structure Variables, and Issuer Firm-Specific Variables 
 
Underwriting spreads or "direct costs" are gross spreads defined as the difference between the offered amount and the proceeds to the 
issuer, expressed as the percentage of the offered amount (or issue size), see Gande, Puri, and Saunders (1999). Spreads are for the 30-
year period, from 1970 through 2000, and are obtained from US Public New Issues Database from Securities and Data Corporation. 
We exclude all financial firms (one-digit SIC code 6) and all firms in regulated industries (one-digit SIC code 4) and all firms whose 
gross spread data was missing from the SDC database. Equity returns are obtained from CRSP. For each regression, the first number is 
the parameter coefficient and the number in parentheses is the associated t-statistic. All standard errors are corrected for 
heteroscedasticity using the White correction. All regressions include industry dummies (at the one-digit SIC code level), the results of 
which are not reported. Detailed descriptions for each independent variable are given in Appendix A.    
  
 
Variables                             Debt                                            SEOs                                          IPOs 
 
Intercept                        0.856a     (5.36)                         7.277a    (41.47)                        8.930a    (37.23) 
 
Macroeconomic variables: 
   15 day                        -4.292     (-1.11)                        13.815     ( 1.10)                         1.173     ( 0.14)   
   Rmt                            -0.001     (-0.45)                         -0.001    (-0.06)                          0.006     ( 1.11) 
   SMB                           -0.005     (-1.55)                         0.004     ( 0.75)                          0.007     ( 1.65) 
   HML                           0.005      ( 1.06)                         0.007     ( 0.85)                          0.003     ( 0.42) 
   Mom                           0.012a     ( 4.85)                         0.020a    ( 3.61)                         -0.007     (-1.23) 
   IPO                             0.000      ( 0.40)                         0.005a    ( 6.29)                          0.006a    (10.21) 
   Tbill                            0.328a     ( 4.36)                         0.710a    ( 4.63)                          0.707a    ( 4.84) 
   Inter                          -0.024a     (-2.66)                        -0.004     (-0.21)                        -0.019     (-0.82) 
   Long                          -0.001      (-0.45)                        -0.001c   (-1.82)                          0.012      (1.30) 
 
Investment banking market structure variables: 
   Bank                          -0.452a    (-16.44)                        0.346a    ( 4.82)                          0.025      ( 0.43) 
   Mktshr                       -0.014a     (-7.99)                        -0.022a    (-7.51)                        -0.008a     (-2.95) 
 
Issuer firm-specific variables: 
   ROA                           0.454     ( 0.62)                           0.032      ( 0.11)                        -0.000      ( 0.00) 
   Profit                          0.434    ( 0.80)                          -1.022a     (-3.51)                        -0.036     (-0.24) 
   Leverage                    1.383a    ( 6.89)                           0.184      ( 1.24)                          0.090     ( 1.61) 
   Dummy fin                 0.649a    ( 5.51)                           0.097      ( 1.58)                          0.132a     ( 3.46)      
   Size                          -0.042a    (-3.28)                         -0.887a   (-29.79)                        -0.761a    (-30.27) 
   Overallot                   0.760a     ( 8.45)                          0.904a    ( 10.12)                         0.488a     ( 2.48) 
   Dummy 1                  -0.404a   (-14.02)                           ---                                                ---                            
   Dummy 2                   0.038c     ( 1.75)                            ---                                                --- 
   Rating                       1.536a     (48.25)                         
   Callable                   -0.142      (-0.28)                           
 
# of obs                        5,645                                            2,691                                          2,268 
Adj. R2                         0.605                                            0.527                                          0.617 
 
 
a statistically significant at the 1% level, b statistically significant at the 5% level, and c statistically significant at the 10% level, 
respectively. 
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Table 6: Coefficient of Partial Determination (Partial R2) to Relative Importance of 
Each Category of Independent Variables on Underwriting Spreads   
 
Underwriting spreads or "direct costs" are gross spreads defined as the difference between the offered amount and the proceeds to 
the issuer, expressed as the percentage of the offered amount (or issue size), see Gande, Puri, and Saunders (1999). Spreads are for 
the 30-year period, from 1970 through 2000, and are obtained from US Public New Issues Database from Securities and Data 
Corporation. We exclude all financial firms (one-digit SIC code 6) and all firms in regulated industries (one-digit SIC code 4) and 
all firms whose gross spread data was missing from the SDC database. Equity returns are obtained from CRSP. For each regression, 
the first number is the parameter coefficient and the number in parentheses is the associated t-statistic. All standard errors are 
corrected for heteroscedasticity using the White correction. All regressions include industry dummies (at the one-digit SIC code 
level), the results of which are not reported. Detailed descriptions for each independent variable are given in Appendix A. The first 
two rows for all issues is an F-statistic and its associated p-value that a sub-category of independent variables is jointly equal to zero. 
We use the regressions in Table 5 in order to calculate the coefficient of partial determination.  The partial R2 between the Y-
variable (i.e., underwriting spreads) and a set of X-variables (X1), given that the other X-variables (X2) is in the model is calculated 
as: [SSE(X2)-SSE(X1,X2)] / SSE(X2), where SSE(X2) is the residual sum of squares when only X2 variables are in the model, and 
SSE(X1,X2) is the residual sum of squares when both X1 and X2 variables are in the model. 
 
 
                                                         Macroeconomic     Investment banking          Issuer                                Full modeld 
                                        variables                 market structure            firm-specific                          adj R2   
                                                                        variables                       variables                             
 
 
Debt 
      F-statistic                     7.223a                      195.85a                       600.12a                      
      (p-value)                     (0.000)                      (0.000)                       (0.000)               
     Partial R2                      0.012                        0.065                           0.517                                  0.605 
 
SEOs 
      F-statistic                    10.03a                       35.00a                         304.51a                       
      (p-value)                     (0.000)                      (0.000)                        (0.000)              
      Partial R2                     0.033                        0.026                           0.407                                  0.527 
 
IPOs 
      F-statistic                    15.40a                       3.504a                          249.06a                         
      (p-value)                     (0.000)                      (0.030)                        (0.000)               
      Partial R2                     0.058                        0.003                           0.400                                 0.617 
 
 
a statistically significant at the 1% level, b statistically significant at the 5% level, and c statistically significant at the 10% level, 
respectively. 
d The adj R2  is obtained from the full regression model that is presented in Table 5. 
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Table 7: Regressions of Underpricing Returns on Macroeconomic Variables, Investment Banking Market 
Structure Variables, and Issuer Firm-Specific Variables 
 
Underpricing returns or "indirect costs" are defined as the difference between the closing price on the day after the issue and the 
offering price expressed as the percentage of the offering price, see Lee, Lochhead, Ritter, and Zhao (1996). We obtain our data from 
US Public New Issues Database from Securities and Data Corporation. We exclude all financial firms (one-digit SIC code 6) and all 
firms in regulated industries (one-digit SIC code 4) and all firms whose gross spread data was missing from the SDC database. Equity 
returns are obtained from CRSP. For each regression, the first number is the parameter coefficient and the number in parentheses is 
the associated t-statistic. All standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity using the White correction. All regressions include 
industry dummies (at the one-digit SIC code level), the results of which are not reported. Detailed descriptions for each independent 
variable are given in Appendix A. 
 
 
Variables                                       SEOs                                           IPOs 
 
Intercept                                  1.108     ( 0.91)                           31.492c    ( 1.66) 
 
Macroeconomic variables: 
     15 day                               176.77     ( 1.47)                          2476.9a    ( 3.48)   
     Rmt                                     0.007     ( 0.11)                           -0.790     (-1.53) 
     SMB                                  -0.026     (-0.46)                           -1.379a    (-2.33) 
     HML                                   0.033     ( 0.50)                           -2.117a    (-3.44) 
     Mom                                   0.033     ( 0.70)                             0.442     ( 0.87) 
     IPO                                     0.015     ( 1.62)                            0.799a    ( 8.32) 
     Tbill                                    1.900     ( 1.45)                         -17.095a    (-2.46) 
     Inter                                  -0.094     (-0.68)                           -2.116     (-1.50) 
     Long                                  -0.019     (-0.32)                           -0.403     (-0.60) 
 
Investment banking market structure variables: 
     Bank                                   1.502a    ( 2.68)                            9.143b    ( 2.19) 
     Mktshr                               -0.161a    (-5.63)                           1.626a     ( 5.47) 
 
Issuer firm-specific variables: 
     ROA                                   -6.035b    (-2.28)                         54.406a    ( 2.95) 
     Profit                                   3.178     ( 1.11)                        -68.868a    (-3.62) 
     Leverage                            -1.940a    (-2.81)                          -3.175     (-0.63) 
     Dummy fin                           0.076     ( 0.16)                          -6.733c    (-1.84)      
     Size                                     0.121     ( 0.76)                          -6.175b    (-2.08) 
     Overallot                             1.277a    ( 2.38)                        -18.450     (-1.06) 
                           
 #of obs                                     1,999                                          1,713 
Adj. R2                                      0.038                                          0.241 
 
 
a statistically significant at the 1% level, b statistically significant at the 5% level, and c statistically significant at the 10% level, 
respectively. 
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Table 8: Coefficient of Partial Determination (Partial R2) to Relative Importance of Each Category of 
Independent Variables on Underwriting Returns   
 
Underpricing returns or "indirect costs" are defined as the difference between the closing price on the day after the issue and the 
offering price expressed as the percentage of the offering price, see Lee, Lochhead, Ritter, and Zhao (1996).We obtain data for the 30-
year period, from 1970 through 2000, from US Public New Issues Database from Securities and Data Corporation. We exclude all 
financial firms (one-digit SIC code 6) and all firms in regulated industries (one-digit SIC code 4) and all firms whose gross spread data 
was missing from the SDC database. Equity returns are obtained from CRSP. For each regression, the first number is the parameter 
coefficient and the number in parentheses is the associated t-statistic. All standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity using the 
White correction. All regressions include industry dummies (at the one-digit SIC code level), the results of which are not reported. 
Detailed descriptions for each independent variable are given in Appendix A. The first two rows for all issues is an F-statistic and its 
associated p-value that a sub-category of independent variables is jointly equal to zero. We use the regressions in Table 7 in order to 
calculate the coefficient of partial determination.  The partial R2 between the Y-variable (i.e., underwriting spreads) and a set of X-
variables (X1), given that the other X-variables (X2) is in the model is calculated as: [SSE(X2)-SSE(X1,X2)] / SSE(X2), where SSE(X2) 
is the residual sum of squares when only X2 variables are in the model, and SSE(X1,X2) is the residual sum of squares when both X1 
and X2 variables are in the model.  
 
 
                                                         Macroeconomic     Investment banking          Issuer                                 Full modeld 
                                        variables                 market structure            firm-specific                          adj R2   
                                                                        variables                       variables                             
 
 
SEOs 
      F-statistic                     1.745                      22.963                         3.208                         
      (p-value)                     (0.074)                     (0.000)                       (0.004)                
      Partial R2                     0.008                        0.023                         0.010                                        0.038 
 
IPOs 
      F-statistic                    23.113                    20.394                          8.169                         
      (p-value)                     (0.000)                    (0.030)                        (0.000)               
      Partial R2                     0.110                       0.024                          0.028                                         0.241 
 
 
a statistically significant at the 1% level, b statistically significant at the 5% level, and c statistically significant at the 10% level, 
respectively. 
d The adj R2  is obtained from the full regression model that is presented in Table 5. 
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Table 9: Regressions of Underwriting Spreads ("Direct Costs") on Underpricing Returns ("Indirect 
Costs") and Other Variables  
 
Underwriting spreads or "direct costs" are gross spreads defined as the difference between the offered amount and the proceeds to the 
issuer, expressed as the percentage of the offered amount (or issue size), see Gande, Puri, and Saunders (1999). Underpricing returns 
or "indirect costs" are defined as the difference between the closing price on the day after the issue and the offering price expressed as 
the percentage of the offering price, see Lee, Lochhead, Ritter, and Zhao (1996). Spreads are for the 30-year period, from 1970 
through 2000, and are obtained from US Public New Issues Database from Securities and Data Corporation. We exclude all financial 
firms (one-digit SIC code 6) and all firms in regulated industries (one-digit SIC code 4) and all firms whose gross spread data was 
missing from the SDC database. Equity returns are obtained from CRSP. For each regression, the first number is the parameter 
coefficient and the number in parentheses is the associated t-statistic. All standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity using the 
White correction. All regressions include industry dummies (at the one-digit SIC code level), the results of which are not reported. 
Detailed descriptions for each independent variable are given in Appendix A.    
 
 
Variables                                             SEOs                                                                        IPOs 
 
 
Intercept                       4.796a  (144.26)      6.867a  (37.32)                      6.870 a (248.25)      8.806a  (42.31) 
 
Macroeconomic variables: 
     15 day                            ---                     7.806   ( 0.78)                              ---                   -7.418   (-1.05)                        
     Rmt                                ---                     0.008   ( 1.16)                              ---                    0.012b   ( 2.33)       
     SMB                               ---                     0.010c  ( 1.90)                              ---                    0.011a   ( 2.94)       
    HML                               ---                     0.012   ( 1.54)                              ---                    0.017a   ( 2.78)          
   Mom                              ---                     0.017a  ( 3.22)                              ---                   -0.000   (-0.05)          
   IPO                                ---                     0.005a  ( 6.25)                              ---                     0.005a  ( 7.24)        
   Tbill                               ---                     0.666a  ( 4.04)                              ---                    0.738a  ( 4.60)                   
   Inter                               ---                    -0.001  (-0.06)                              ---                   -0.021  (-0.87)         
   Long                               ---                   -0.001C (-1.69)                              ---                    0.008   ( 0.72)      
 
Investment banking market structure variables: 
    Bank                              ---                      0.322a   (3.85)                              ---                     0.067   ( 1.17)         
    Mkt shr                          ---                     -0.017a  (-5.47)                              ---                   -0.005c  ( 1.76)         
                    Und. returns                0.022a  (3.75)        0.012a   ( 2.46)                          0.000 a   (2.59)       0.001   ( 1.64)                   
 
 Issuer firm-specific variables: 
     ROA                               ---                     0.003   ( 0.01)                               ---                   -0.043  (-0.35)                                                         
     Profit                             ---                    -0.806 a  (-3.29)                              ---                     0.005  ( 0.04)               
     Leverage                        ---                     7.806   ( 0.78)                               ---                     0.065  ( 1.36)        
     Dummy fin                     ---                     0.114    ( 1.04)                              ---                     0.137a  ( 3.65)      
     Size                                ---                    -0.816 a (-26.26)                             ---                    -0.657a (-28.01)    
     Overallot                       ---                     0.942 a   ( 8.88)                              ---                     0.138   ( 0.86)    
                    
 # of obs                           1,999                   1,999     1,713                 1,713 
 Adj. R2                            0.013                   0.536                                          0.002                  0.604 
  
 
a statistically significant at the 1% level, b statistically significant at the 5% level, and c statistically significant at the 10% level, 
respectively. 
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Table 10: Regressions of Total Costs (“Direct” plus “Indirect”) on Macroeconomic Variables, Investment 
Banking Market Structure Variables, and Issuer Firm-Specific Variables 
 
Total costs are the sum of underwriting spreads (or "direct costs") and  underpricing returns (or "indirect costs"). Underwriting spreads 
are gross spreads defined as the difference between the offered amount and the proceeds to the issuer, expressed as the percentage of 
the offered amount (or issue size), see Gande, Puri, and Saunders (1999). Underpricing returns or "indirect costs" are defined as the 
difference between the closing price on the day after the issue and the offering price expressed as the percentage of the offering price, 
see Lee, Lochhead, Ritter, and Zhao (1996). Spreads are for the 30-year period, from 1970 through 2000, and are obtained from US 
Public New Issues Database from Securities and Data Corporation. We exclude all financial firms (one-digit SIC code 6) and all 
firms in regulated industries (one-digit SIC code 4) and all firms whose gross spread data was missing from the SDC database. Equity 
returns data obtained from CRSP. For each regression, the first number is the parameter coefficient and the number in parentheses is 
the associated t-statistic. All standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity using the White correction. All regressions include 
industry dummies (at the one-digit SIC code level), the results of which are not reported. Detailed descriptions for each independent 
variable are given in Appendix A.    
 
 
Variables                                       SEOs                                           IPOs 
 
Intercept                                  7.988a    ( 6.48)                           40.333b   ( 2.11) 
 
Macroeconomic variables: 
     15 day                               186.63     ( 1.54)                          247.28a    ( 3.47)   
     Rmt                                     0.014     ( 0.23)                           -0.778     (-1.51) 
     SMB                                  -0.017     (-0.29)                           -1.370a    (-2.31) 
     HML                                   0.046     ( 0.68)                           -2.103a    (-3.41) 
     Mom                                   0.050     ( 1.06)                             0.442     ( 0.87) 
     IPO                                     0.020b    ( 2.21)                            0.805a    ( 8.37) 
     Tbill                                    3.599c    ( 1.79)                         -16.377a    (-2.36) 
     Inter                                   -0.096    (-0.68)                           -2.140     (-1.51) 
     Long                                   -0.031    (-0.50)                           -0.396     (-0.59) 
 
Investment banking market structure variables: 
     Bank                                   1.841a    ( 3.24)                            9.220b    ( 2.21) 
     Mktshr                               -0.179a    (-6.15)                           1.623a     ( 5.45) 
 
Issuer firm-specific variables: 
     ROA                                   -6.102b    (-2.27)                         54.424a    ( 2.95) 
     Profit                                   2.299     ( 0.79)                        -68.941a    (-3.62) 
     Leverage                            -1.849a    (-2.55)                          -3.114     (-0.62) 
     Dummy fin                           0.118     ( 0.24)                          -6.604c    (-1.80)      
     Size                                    -0.693a    (-4.12)                         -6.839b    (-2.30) 
     Overallot                             2.234a    ( 4.00)                        -18.333     (-1.05) 
                           
 #of obs                                     1,999                                          1,713 
Adj. R2                                      0.071                                          0.240 
 
 
a statistically significant at the 1% level, b statistically significant at the 5% level, and c statistically significant at the 10% level, 
respectively. 
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Table 11: Coefficient of Partial Determination (Partial R2) to Relative Importance of 
Each Category of Independent Variables on Total Costs ("Direct" plus "Indirect")   
 
Total costs are the sum of underwriting spreads (or "direct costs") and underpricing returns (or "indirect costs"). Underwriting spreads 
are gross spreads defined as the difference between the offered amount and the proceeds to the issuer, expressed as the percentage of 
the offered amount (or issue size), see Gande, Puri, and Saunders (1999). Underpricing returns or "indirect costs" are defined as the 
difference between the closing price on the day after the issue and the offering price expressed as the percentage of the offering price, 
see Lee, Lochhead, Ritter, and Zhao (1996). We obtain data for the 30-year period, from 1970 through 2000, from US Public New 
Issues Database from Securities and Data Corporation. We exclude all financial firms (one-digit SIC code 6) and all firms in 
regulated industries (one-digit SIC code 4) and all firms whose gross spread data was missing from the SDC database. Equity returns 
are obtained from CRSP. For each regression, the first number is the parameter coefficient and the number in parentheses is the 
associated t-statistic. All standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity using the White correction. All regressions include 
industry dummies (at the one-digit SIC code level), the results of which are not reported. Detailed descriptions for each independent 
variable are given in Appendix A. The first two rows for all issues is an F-statistic and its associated p-value that a sub-category of 
independent variables is jointly equal to zero. We use the regressions in Table 7 in order to calculate the coefficient of partial 
determination.  The partial R2 between the Y-variable (i.e., total costs spreads) and a set of X-variables (X1), given that the other X-
variables (X2) is in the model is calculated as: [SSE(X2)-SSE(X1,X2)] / SSE(X2), where SSE(X2) is the residual sum of squares when 
only X2 variables are in the model, and SSE(X1,X2) is the residual sum of squares when both X1 and X2 variables are in the model.  
 
 
                                                         Macroeconomic     Investment banking          Issuer                                Full modeld 
                                        variables                 market structure            firm-specific                         adj R2   
                                                                        variables                       variables                             
 
 
SEOs 
      F-statistic                     2.665                      28.415                         8.453                           
      (p-value)                     (0.005)                     (0.000)                       (0.000)                
      Partial R2                     0.012                        0.028                         0.025                                     0.071 
 
IPOs 
      F-statistic                    23.305                    20.300                          8.639                          
      (p-value)                     (0.000)                    (0.000)                        (0.000)               
      Partial R2                     0.110                       0.023                          0.030                                    0.240 
 
 
a statistically significant at the 1% level, b statistically significant at the 5% level, and c statistically significant at the 10% level, 
respectively. 
d The adj R2  is obtained from the full regression model that is presented in Table 10. 
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Appendix A: Variable Definitions 
 
 
Variables    Definitions 
 
 
Dependent variables: 
Gross spread Difference between the offered amount and the proceeds to the issuer, 
expressed as the percentage of the offered amount (for example, see Gande, 
Puri, and Saunders 1999) 
 
Underpricing returns Difference between the closing price on the day after the issue and the 
offering price expressed as the percentage of the offering price, (for 
example, see Lee, Lochhead, Ritter, and Zhao 1996). 
  
Independent  variables: 
15 day The value-weighted market index in the 15-days prior to the offer date 
(Loughran and Ritter 2002) 
 
Rmt One-month lagged data of the value-weighted market portfolio (Fama and 
French 1993) 
 SMB    One-month lagged values of the monthly returns on the smallest size 
portfolio minus the monthly returns on the largest size portfolio (Fama  
and French 1993) 
  
 HML    One-month lagged values of the monthly returns on the highest book- 
to-market portfolio minus the monthly returns on the lowest book-to- 
market portfolio (Fama and French 1993)   
 
 Mom    One-month lagged values of the momentum factor, defined as the  
monthly returns on an equally weighted average of the highest 30% 11-  
month returns minus the monthly returns on an equally weighted  
average of the lowest 30% 11-month returns  (Carhart 1997) 
 
IPO    One-month lagged values on the returns of Ritter’s IPO index  
 
Tbill One-month lagged values of the monthly returns on one-year government 
bonds 
 
Inter One-month lagged values of the monthly returns on five-year government 
bonds 
 
Long One-month lagged values of the monthly returns on twenty-year 
government bonds 
 
Bank Set to unity if the issue date was after 1998 (after 1999) for debt offerings (for 
equity offerings), and zero otherwise (Gande, Puri, and Saunders 1999) 
 
Mktshr Total percentage market share ownership of the lead managers in the year of 
the issue     
 
ROA Issuer firm’s ratio of net income to total assets 
 
Profit Issuer firm’s ratio of operating income before depreciation to total assets 
 
Appendix A  (continued) 
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Appendix A (continued): 
 
Variables    Definitions 
 
 
Debt Issuer firm’s ratio of total leverage to total assets 
 
 Dumfin    Set to unity if the above three financial statement variables are  
unavailable for issuer firms, and zero otherwise 
 
Size  Natural logarithm of the dollar value of issue size 
 
 Overallot    Set to unity if the syndicate has an over-allotment or green-shoe option to  
     purchase additional amounts of the issue (Ritter 1996, Hansen, Fuller, and  
      Janjigian 1987) 
 
 Lmat    Set to unity if debt issue has maturity less than five years, and zero  
     otherwise 
 
 Imat    Set to unity if debt issue has maturity between five and fifteen years, and  
     zero otherwise 
 
 Rating    Set to unity if issuer firm has Moody’s speculative rating of Ba1 to C,  
     and zero otherwise 
 
 Callable    Set to unity if debt issue is callable, and zero otherwise 
 
 
 48
Appendix B: The Relationship Between Partial R2 and the Full Model R2 
 
 Initially lets take the case where we have two sets of independent variables, 1X , 2X .  
Let 21ρ  be the 2R between Y-variable and 1X ,  
2
2ρ  be the 2R between Y-variable and 2X , and 
2R be the full model 2R between Y-variable and )X,X( 21 . 
 Then, the partial 2R between Y-variable and 1X , given 2X in the model, is )1/()R(
2
2
2
2
2 ρρ −−  and 
the partial 2R between Y-variable and 2X , given 1X in the model, is )1/()R(
2
1
2
1
2 ρρ −− . The sum 
of these two partial sR2  equals DR 2 + , where 
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2 ρρρρρρ −−−−−R )]1)(1[( 2221 ρρ −− . If D is negative, the sum of the 
partial sR2  is less than the full model 2R  and vice versa. Except for the extreme case where 21ρ  
and 22ρ  equal to zero (which we see is not our result), D does not equal zero. Therefore, sum of all 
partial 2R s from each set of X-variables does not equal the 2R of the full model (for more 
explanation of this see Pindyck and Rubenfeld 1981). 
 
For a general case, if all X-variables are (non-overlapped) partitioned into K-subsets, then 
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